

Russell's Paradox, Self-applicability, and Higher-orderism

Abstract. Higher-orderists, who think higher-order quantifications are perfectly legitimate, argue that second-order quantification is *sui generis* form of quantifications that is neither reducible nor explicable in first-order terms, usually by appealing to Russell's paradox that arises from attempting to reduce second-order quantification into first-order one. In this paper, I first show that if self-applications like 'FF' are allowed in the second-order language, a version of Russell's paradox arises within the second-order language, which would seriously undermine the legitimacy of second-order language. I point out that despite the importance of the matter, higher-orderists do not care much to give a robust justification for why self-applications should not be allowed, and that justifications on the market are not satisfactory. Then, I offer an account of second-order entities, where second-order entities are understood as ways, and show that the account gives a natural and satisfactory justification as to why self-applications should not be allowed in the second-order language.

Keywords. Higher-orderism, Russell's paradox, Second-order quantification, self-applications, Ways, second-order entities